Similar Search Results

Looking After Number Two? Competition, Cooperation and Workplace Interaction

Barmby, Tim; Sessions, John G.; Zangelidis, Alexandros - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013

cooperative behavior. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884115

Cooperatives in a Global Economy: Key Economic Issues, Recent Trends, and Potential for Development

Smith, Stephen C.; Rothbaum, Jonathan - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013

In this paper, we examine major trends and potential for cooperatives in the context of four prominent socio-economic issues: the lack of jobs, economic and social inequality, educational mobility, and the priority need for innovations. We present recent data on the amount and types of job...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884382

Employee Stock Purchase Plans: Gift or Incentive? Evidence from a Multinational Corporation

Bryson, Alex; Freeman, Richard B. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

gift reciprocate with greater loyalty and effort. But ESPPs diverge from standard gift exchange or efficiency wage models …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959665

Workplace Democracy and Job Flows

Alves, Guillermo; Burdín, Gabriel; Dean, Andres - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

the understanding of the allocative efficiency effects of worker participation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959705

The Labor Supply of Self-Employed Workers: The Choice of Working Hours in Worker Co-ops

Pencavel, John - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

Workers in cooperatives are self-employed workers and, if they resemble employees in conventional workplaces, they care about the length of their working hours. In this paper, their choice of hours is characterized as a conventional labor supply decision and a familiar hours-wage relationship is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959719

Equality under Threat by the Talented: Evidence from Worker-Managed Firms

Burdín, Gabriel - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013

Are high-ability individuals more likely to quit egalitarian regimes? Does the threat of exit by talented individuals restrict the redistributive capacity of democratic organizations? This paper revisits that long-standing debate by analyzing the interplay between compensation structure and quit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011271976

Wages, Employment, and Capital in Capitalist and Worker-Owned Firms

Pencavel, John; Pistaferri, Luigi; Schivardi, Fabiano - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

Differences in wages, employment, and capital between worker-owned and capitalist enterprises are computed from a matched employer-worker panel data set from Italy, the market economy with the greatest incidence of worker-owned and worker-managed firms. These differences are related to orthodox...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233888

Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring

Sessions, John G.; Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

We investigate the relationship between the slope of the wage-tenure profile and the level of monitoring across two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data. Our theoretical model predicts that increased monitoring leads to a decline in the slope of the wage-tenure profile. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762341

Performance Pay and the Erosion of Worker Cooperation: Field Experimental Evidence

Burks, Stephen; Carpenter, Jeffrey; Goette, Lorenz - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the character of a social dilemma. Firms therefore suffer efficiency … preferences, but are much more cooperative than students. Among messengers, we find that employees at firms that pay for … performance are significantly less cooperative than those who are paid hourly or are members of cooperatives. To examine whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703260

Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity

Carpenter, Jeffrey; Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which requires reasonably accurate public information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703699

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last