Reductions of social security contributions (RSSC) and a basic income (BI) (or the related Negative Income Tax) are considered in a dynamic general equilibrium framework with imperfect competition on the labour market (the ‘wage-setting/price-setting’ model). The cases with homogeneous and...

The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union has always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficiently, i.e. it uses fully its labor force. However, nothing constrains the firm to do so and production with under-utilization of labor may actually...

Within an incomplete information framework, we develop a model of wage determination in a unionized Cournot oligopoly. The assumption of incomplete information allows the possibility of strikes, which waste industry potential ressources, at equilibrium. Facing such deadweight loss, the...

In this paper, I discriminate among alternative models of bargaining for wages and employment (right-to-manage, efficient bargaining and general bargaining models) using Belgian aggregate data. I estimate the ECM representation of a dynamic employment equation for each model using...

We develop a model of wage determination with private information in a unionized imperfectly competitive industry. Under two different bargaining structures (firm-level vs industry-level), we investigate the effects of the degree of product differentiation and the type of market competition...

We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short...

We develop a model of wage determination with private information in an unionized oligopolistic industry and we use it to compare the outcome of collective bargaining under two different bargaining structures- one in which a single wage is bargained at the industry-level and one in which the...

We analyze a unionized duopoly model to examine how unions affect the incentives for merger. We find that, once the union has the option to delegate, an increase in the union bargaining power can create incentives for the firms to merge.

We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which te union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus-maximizing delegates or to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that the strike activity is greater whenever the...

We develop a spatial two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized imperfectly competitive industries. We investigage the effects of separated product markets opening up for competition as well as of further market integration on the negotiated wage and the strike...