The authors study the Nash equilibria of a two-person, infinitely-repeated game in which players' preferences depend on repeated game payoffs and the complexity of the strategies they use. The model considered is that of A. Rubinstein (1986). Necessary conditions on the structure of the...

Consider a two-person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and offers each period, and collect payoffs (as a function of that period's actions) while bargaining proceeds. This can alternatively be viewed as an infinitely repeated game wherein players can offer one...

In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, the authors distinguish among the effects of (1) reducing the interest rate, (2) shortening the period over which actions are held fixed, and (3) shortening the lag with which accumulated information is reported. All three changes are...

This paper presents a systematic framework for studying infinitely-repeated games with discounting, focusing on pure strategy (subgame) perfect equilibria. It introduces a number of concepts whi ch organize the theory in a natural way. These include the idea of an optimal penal code, and the...

Consider a social choice correspondence as a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over some finite set of alternatives. A virtually implementable social choice function in Nash equilibrium is defined, under mild domain restrictions it is shown that in societies with at least three...

The authors investigate the implementation of social choice functions that map to lotteries over alternatives. They require virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies. Under very weak domain restrictions, they show that if there are three or more players, any social choice...

We present a model in which an asset bubble can persist despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs. The resilience of the bubble stems from the inability of arbitrageurs to temporarily coordinate their selling strategies. This "synchronization problem" together with the individual incentive...

This paper investigates pure strategy sequential equilibria of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. The approach emphasizes the equilibrium value set and the static optimization problems embedded in extremal equilibria. A succession of propositions, central among which is "self-generation,"...