We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent manipulates two decision-makers’ joint decision on alternative proposals. With the heterogeneity of two decision-makers’ value of the outside option, only the decision-maker with the...

We model strategic mediation of the communication between an informed expert with a discrete type space and an uninformed decision maker. A strategic mediator can improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert.

We estimate the relative contribution of recursive preferences versus adaptive learning in accounting for the tail thickness of price–dividends/rents ratios. We find that both of these sources of volatility account for volatility in liquid (stocks) but not illiquid (housing) assets.

The assumption that individual preferences are rational and consistent with standard economic theory is often appropriate, but may be optimistic if consumers are uncertain about either their preferences or how the market operates. Both sources of uncertainty may present themselves in lab...

In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.

We provide an infinite-horizon model of nonmonotone intertemporal preferences that capture a strong dislike of volatility involved in a utility sequence. As an intermediate result, we also derive a nonmonotone version of multiple-priors utility.

The purpose in this letter is to demonstrate, employing two parametric forms of the Markowitz model of utility, that heterogeneity of preferences of Markowitz agents can contribute towards an explanation of why lotteries typically have multiple rather than single prizes.

We propose an alternative axiomatization of the model of intertemporal utility smoothing suggested by Wakai (2008) without introducing auxiliary consumption risk.