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Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Tomala, Tristan - In: Games and economic behavior 67 (2009) 2, pp. 682-694

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909315

Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Heller, Yuval; Solan, Eilon; Tomala, Tristan - In: Games and economic behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 222-234

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511279

Communication and reputation in procurement auctions : some empirical evidence

Heinrich, Timo - In: Economics letters 114 (2012) 2, pp. 164-167

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009547328

Secure message transmission on directed networks

Renault, Jérôme; Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan - In: Games and economic behavior 85 (2014), pp. 1-18

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489258

Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Renault, Jérôme; Tomala, Tristan - In: Games and economic behavior 49 (2004) 2, pp. 313-344

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002396383

Belief-free communication equilibria in repeated games

Tomala, Tristan - In: Mathematics of operations research 38 (2013) 4, pp. 617-637

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010210766

The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners : a study based on field and laboratory data

Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo - In: Games and economic behavior 112 (2018), pp. 49-66

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012174443

Secure message transmission on directed networks

Renault, Jérôme; Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 1-18

A sender wishes to transmit a secret to a receiver through a communication network, where some nodes are controlled by … an adversary. We characterize the directed networks for which there exist ε-secret and ε-strongly secure communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049722