The authors investigates refinements of two solutions, the saddle and the weak saddle, defined by Shapley (1964) for two-player zero-sum games. Applied to weak tournaments, the firsy refinement, the mixed saddle, is unique and gives us a new solution, generally lying between the GETCHA and...

A two-stage game is used in this paper to model a long-run market with spatially separated producers and with multi-period demands: first, firmas simultaneously and independently invest their capacities; second, after capacities are set up in the first stage and made public, firms engage in a...

We introduce a procedure that uses basic typological charasteristics of equilibrium correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts, to define broad equivalence classes of finite generic games in normal form. The proposed procedure is viewed as a potentially useful way of both organizing the...

An oligopoly with spatially dispersed producers and consumers and with multi-period demands is modeled in this paper.

In perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent goods and a formulation with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence carries over in a particular...

Calling upon both positive and normative economics, the authors attempt to characterize the issues at stake in the current international negotiations on climatic change.

The paper presents a game-theoretic model to investigate to what extent an employee privatization program of State owned firm can be feasible under certain assumptions concerning the players objective functions and the market structure in which the firm operates.

We extend Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) structure theorem concerning the Nash equilibrium correspondence to show that its graph is not only homeomorphic to the underlying space of games but that it is also unknotted. This is then shown to have some basic consequences for dynamics whose rest...

The location of facilities in order to provide service for customers is a well-studied problem in the operations research literature. In this paper, we establish strong connextions between fair cost allocations and linear programming relaxations for several variants of the facility location...

Purely non-cooperative principles, as itereted dominance and backward induction, explain divided government.