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Enforcing social norms: Trust-building and community enforcement
Deb, Joyee; González-Díaz, Julio - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1387-1433
We study impersonal exchange, and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215292
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Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: Experts vs. quacks
Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019
of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster's reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012140661
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Trust and Reputation under Asymmetric Information
Janas, Moritz; Oljemark, Emilia - 2020
We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012287806
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Trust and betrayals: Reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment
Pei, Harry - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 2, pp. 449-475
I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189075
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Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals
Jäger, Gerhard; Koch-Metzger, Lars; Riedel, Frank - 2009
We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272564
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Whom can you trust? Reputation and cooperation in networks
King, Maia - 2017
Community enforcement is an important device for sustaining efficiency in some repeated games of cooperation. We investigate cooperation when information about players' reputations spreads to their future partners through links in a social network that connects them. We find that information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011928009
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Reputation with long run players and imperfect observation
Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2009
Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players with equal discount … reputation result. If player 1 is a particular commitment type with positive probability and player 2's actions are imperfectly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282883
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Reputation with long run players and imperfect
Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2009
We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2's type is commonly known. We show that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282903
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A two-sided reputation result with long run
Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2009
, i.e., a two-sided reputation result would hold. In this note we show that this conjecture is indeed true for a wide set … of stage games for which the one-sided reputation result of Atakan and Ekmekci (2008) holds. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282930
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The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers: Theory and evidence
Gropp, Reint E.; Karapandza, Rasa; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504361