downgrades quality whereas the seller sometimes upgrades it. Our model of targeting with endogenous product quality provides some … new insights into the way the transition from mass to specialized advertising can affect market outcomes. Quality …

Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the … unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: in the first one, firms disclose … quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own …

power and in quality to stimulate content consumption. The profit-maximizing tariff is zero if productive data are highly …

We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal, using a model where an entrant can choose to advertise by … comparing its product to that of an established incumbent. Comparative advertising, comparing quality of one’s own product to …

, both quality and cost leaders choose higher advertising intensities and charge higher prices than their competitors. In …

Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the … unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: In the first one, firms disclose … quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own …

conformity. In equilibrium, both quality and cost leaders choose higher advertising intensities and charge higher prices than …