We examine the effect of protection of proprietary information on forced CEO turnover decisions. Relying on changes in the enforceability of the covenant-not-to-compete, we show that strengthening the protection of proprietary information increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and the...

The debate about the compensation of executives and directors is a discussion about incentives and agency costs. This article analyzes basic tools to reduce agency costs and also assesses the ongoing debate about the future regulation of the compensation of executives and directors. It draws...

The World Trade Organization (WTO) as an institution accords much less of a role to its chief officer and her staff, namely the WTO Director-General and the Secretariat, than do any of its sister international organizations—the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for...

This study examines the relation between the internationalization of firms and CEO compensation. Starting from a sample of Norwegian and Swedish listed firms we analyze the effects of internationalization as manifest in the capital market (international cross-listing), the market for corporate...