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The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - In: Journal of economic theory 132 (2007) 1, pp. 461-473
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003407413
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Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Games and economic behavior 61 (2007) 1, pp. 27-49
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003565928
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Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
Fudenberg, Drew (contributor); Levine, David K. (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002531297
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The nash threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
Fudenberg, Drew (contributor); Levine, David K. (contributor) - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001826495
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Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient
Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.; Takahashi, Satoru - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068528
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The castle on the hill
Levine, David K. - In: Review of economic dynamics 3 (2000) 2, pp. 330-337
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001655824
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A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication
Block, Juan I.; Levine, David K. - In: Economic theory bulletin 5 (2017) 1, pp. 9-19
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011649267
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Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games
Block, Juan I.; Levine, David K. - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 45 (2016) 4, pp. 971-984
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011635171
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Repeated games where the payoffs and monitoring structure are unknown
Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 78 (2010) 5, pp. 1673-1710
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008798255
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The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi - In: Journal of economic theory 146 (2011) 4, pp. 1664-1683
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009261858