This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Simple conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium point are provided. In equilibrium, all agents are active on the same markets and prices are identical across markets, so that all...

Given a game and a dynamics on the space of strategies it is possible to associate to any component of Nash equilibria, an integer, this is the index, see Ritzberger (1994). This number gives useful information on the equilibrium set and in particular on its stability properties under the given...

The Nash equilibrium concept for strategic form games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependant utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) area better predictor...

In an example with two objects and four bidders, some of which have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential , the one-shot simultaneous, and the...

Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria are useful notions to understand the strategic effects of information and communication. Between these two models, a protocol generates information through communication. We define a secure protocol as a protocol from which no individual may...

The authors develop a two-stage negotiation model to study the impact of costly inspections on both the coalition formation outcome and the per-member payoffs.

This paper provides a methodology to study coalition formation problems with externalities and heterogeneous players, whensome subset of the players can act as "coalition developers" over time. The framework provided here allows to explicitly predict the timing of admission to coalitions, the...

This paper deals with N-Person sequential bargaining games with complete information (perfect or almost perfect information). For N-person sequential bargaining games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements.