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A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021
always true, and many well-known mechanisms are simple, including ascending auctions, posted prices, and serial dictatorship …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584083
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Strictly strategy-proof auctions
Escudé, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig - In: Mathematical social sciences 107 (2020), pp. 13-16
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012434261
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392733
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132
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Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the optimality of cutoff mechanisms
Dworczak, Piotr - 2016
I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865063
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Pure information design in classic auctions
Sorokin, Constantine; Winter, Eyal - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013364413
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Mitigating risk selection in healthcare entitlement programs : a beneficiary-level competitive bidding approach
Montanera, Daniel; Mishra, Abhay Nath; Raghu, T. S. - In: Information systems research : ISR 33 (2022) 4, pp. 1221-1247
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321702
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Auction Theory : Introductory Exercises with Answer Keys
Choi, Pak-Sing; Munoz-Garcia, Felix - 2021 - 1st ed. 2021.
Chapter 1: Second-price auctions -- Chapter 2: First-price auctions -- Chapter 3: First-price auctions, Extensions … -- Chapter 4: All-pay auctions and auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders -- Chapter 5: Third-price auctions, kth …-price auctions, and lotteries -- Chapter 6: The Revenue Equivalence principle -- Chapter 7: Common-value auctions -- Chapter 8: Multi …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012519940
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Auction theory : introductory exercises with answer keys
Choi, Pak-Sing; Muñoz-García, Félix - 2021
text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which …-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions …, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012493389
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Subsidies, knapsack auctions and Dantzig’s greedy heuristic
Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - 2009
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848830