Showing 1 - 10 of 259
Motivierte Mitarbeiter sind ein zentraler Erfolgsfaktor für Unternehmen. Eine wichtige Führungsaufgabe ist somit, die Motivation der Mitarbeiter in entsprechendem Maße zu verbessern bzw. zu fördern. Nachhaltige Veränderungen lassen sich aber nur dann realisieren, wenn durch entspre-chende...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001793272
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014443361
What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort require- ment? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal- agent model where control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422159
We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422162
Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting control can reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differ in their propensity for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277418
Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting controlcan reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows thatintention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differin their propensity for reciprocity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326255
In many organizations, reward decisions depend on subjective performance evaluations. However, evaluating an employee's performance is often difficult. In this paper, we develop a model in which the employee is uncertain about his own performance and about the manager's ability to assess him....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326329
We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427614
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000987477
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001396613