In this study, we examine the crucial question whether the presence of female directors in the compensation committee (CC) improves the committee objectivity (i.e., paying executives for performance) in context of three countries namely Australia, China, and Pakistan. Using the data of public...

We study the effect of board gender diversity on executive and director equity-linked incentives. The provision of equity incentives to executives is costly for shareholders. We argue theoretically that the optimal compensation given to executives by a board with superior monitoring ability will...

We study whether boardroom gender diversity affects CEO pay. Specifically, we investigate the association between boardroom gender diversity and CEO pay deviation from the optimal level of CEO pay based on firm characteristics and market performance. Using a sample of 2,288 firm‐year...

This study examines the interaction of conflicting preferences among directors, performance pay, and group effort. I model a corporate board in which directors voluntarily choose to research (or not research) an investment decision made by the board on behalf of the firm. Free-riding among...

The motivation behind Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank Act was the increasing pay inequality and supposed CEOs' rent extraction. It required public companies to disclose CEO-to-employee pay ratios. Using the ratios reported by S&P1500 firms in 2017-18, this paper examines whether companies led by...

We document that the cross-sectional variation in CEO pay levels has declined precipitously, both at the economy level and within industry and size groups. We find evidence consistent with one explanation; reciprocal benchmarking (i.e., firms including each other in the set of peers used to...