Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 1,923
Cover Image
Striking features of the Portuguese labor market
Greene, William H.; Martins, Ana Paula - 2002
´s willingness to participate in a strike. We develop and compare two signaling models of strikes: in one, firms are able to monitor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011512984
Cover Image
Striking Features of the Labor Market
Greene, William H.; Martins, Ana P. - 2002
´s willingness to participate in a strike. We develop and compare two signaling models of strikes: in one, firms are able to monitor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011496031
Cover Image
Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Damage Caps under Self-Serving Bias
Landeo, Claudia M.; Izmalkov, Sergei; Nikitin, Maxim - Department of Economics, University of Alberta - 2012
This paper presents a strategic model of incentives for care and litigation under asymmetric information and self-serving bias, and studies the effects of caps on non-economic damages. We contribute to the theoretical law and economics literature by providing the first assessment of the effects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266379
Cover Image
Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Damage Caps under Self-Serving Bias
Landeo, Claudia M.; Izmalkov, Sergei; Nikitin, Maxim - Department of Economics, University of Alberta - 2012
This paper presents a strategic model of incentives for care and litigation under asymmetric information and self-serving bias, and studies the effects of damage caps. We contribute to the behavioral economics literature by generalizing the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept to environments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266401
Cover Image
Striking Features of the Labor Market
Greene, William H.; Martins, Ana P. - Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI) - 2002
´s willingness to participate in a strike. We develop and compare two signaling models of strikes: in one, firms are able to monitor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010721204
Cover Image
Surenchères salariales et conflictualité : une approche expérimentale
Tournadre, Fabienne; Villeval, Marie-Claire - In: Revue d'économie politique 112 (2002) 1, pp. 157-171
Based on a non cooperative model with asymmetric information tested by means of a laboratory experiment, this paper examines the influence of a negotiation outcome on the demand behavior in subsequent negotiations. While the assumption of inflationary wage claims is rejected by the data, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011187186
Cover Image
Striking Features of the Labor Market: Theory
Greene, William H.; Martins, Ana P. - In: Journal of Economics and Econometrics 56 (2013) 2, pp. 1-24
´s willingness to participate in a strike. We develop and compare two signaling models of strikes: in one, firms are able to monitor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011078543
Cover Image
Striking Features of the Labor Market: Empirical Evidence
Greene, William H.; Martins, Ana P. - In: Journal of Economics and Econometrics 56 (2013) 2, pp. 25-53
The present paper aims at explaining strike incidence, measured by the proportion of strikers observed in each sector …, and strike severeness, proxied by a measure of mean strike hours lost per worker in each industry. We find that Industry … concentration dissuades striking – more concentrated sectors provide higher wage growth, hence, strike disputes are rarer and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011078559
Cover Image
Job Security as an Endogenous Job Characteristic
Jahn, Elke J.; Wagner, Thomas - Nationalökonomisk Institut, Institut for Økonomi - 2008
This paper develops a hedonic model of job security (JS). Workers with heterogeneous JS-preferences pay the hedonic price for JS to employers, who incur labor-hoarding costs from supplying JS. In contrast to the Wage-Bill Argument, equilibrium unemployment is strictly positive, as workers with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005424116
Cover Image
Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts
Muehlheusser, Gerd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
We analyze the role of damage clauses in labor contracts using a model in which a worker may want to terminate his current employment relationship and work for another firm. We show that the initial parties to a contract have an incentive to stipulate excessive damage clauses, which leads to ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566339