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The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions

Obara, Ichiro - In: Advances in Theoretical Economics 8 (2008) 1, pp. 1399-1399

Consider a situation in which a principal commits to a mechanism first and then agents choose unobservable actions before their payoff-relevant types are realized. The agents' actions may affect not only their payoffs directly but also the distribution of their types as well. This paper extends...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086845

Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types

Krähmer, Daniel - 2010

This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers' valuations through an unobservable ex …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272760

Auctions with dynamic costly information acquisition

Golrezaei, Negin; Nazerzadeh, Hamid - In: Operations research 65 (2017) 1, pp. 130-144

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011648891

On the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation : the case of correlated types

Kushnir, Alexey - 2013

We consider general social choice environments with private values and correlated types. Each agent's matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists a dominant strategy incentive compatible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781889

On the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: The case of correlated types

Kushnir, Alexey - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332042

Chapter 34 Information, incentives, and the design of agricultural policies

Chambers, Robert G. - In: Handbook of agricultural economics : volume 2, part B, …, (pp. 1751-1825). 2002

This chapter surveys studies that have used the methods of mechanism design, optimal taxation, nonlinear pricing, and principal-agent analyses in the analysis of agricultural policy. The optimal design and reform of agricultural policy are studied under the presumption that agricultural...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024092

When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?

Major, Iván - 2013

Governments must usually take policy decisions with an imperfect knowledge of the economic actors' type or the actors' effort level. These issues are addressed within the framework of classic adverse selection or moral hazard models. I discuss in this paper how would the government’s and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211955

Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard

Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1357-1401

We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We show that under a multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327130

Information elicitation and influenza vaccine production

Chick, Stephen E.; Hasija, Sameer; Nasiry, Javad - In: Operations research 65 (2017) 1, pp. 75-96

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011648867

An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence

Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336

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