We study experimentally the relationship between intra-firm wage dispersion chosen by principals and workers' performance. Principals show a preference for more egalitarian wage schemes, and workers are negatively influenced by high levels of wage inequality.

We study whether information about imminent future dividends can abate bubbles in experimental asset markets. Using the seminal design of Smith et al. (1988) we find that markets where traders are asymmetrically informed about future dividends have smaller, and shorter, bubbles than markets with...

Building on previous studies on perceptions of inequality, welfare and risk we investigate the structure of individuals' rankings of uncertain prospects in terms of risk and their relationship to individual preferences. We examine three interlinked propositions that are fundamental to the...

A probability of a partner not fulfilling his forward contract obligations (contract failure) increases in a transition economy. This project investigates the process of price and quantity discovery in a laboratory setting when there is (1) an endogenous choice between forward and spot market...

A cartel is socially not desirable. But is it a normative problem? And has merger control reason to be concerned about tacit collusion? Neither is evident once one has seen that the members of a cartel face a problem of strategic interaction. It is routinely analysed in terms of game theory....

The article distinguishes the scientist of the opinable thing, because the epistemology must explain: the nature and the path to obtain the concepts and scientific theories; the methodology with which one threads the laws and theories that give sustenance to sciences. This is the importance of...

We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms ``truth bias'' reported in...