Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 9,309
Cover Image
Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - Department of Economics, College of William & Mary - 2006
extremely weak independence condition is incompatible with each of anonymity and neutrality (Campbell and Kelly [2006]). This …For a finite number of alternatives, in the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588182
Cover Image
Pareto, Anonymity, and Independence: Four Alternatives
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - Department of Economics, College of William & Mary - 2006
for a social choice rule to satisfy all of (1) Pareto, (2) anonymity, (3) full domain, and (4) independence of some …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588176
Cover Image
Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economics Letters 118 (2013) 1, pp. 10-12
Anonymity and neutrality conflict if the number of individuals is even and a single alternative is selected. Limited … neutrality, anonymity, and monotonicity imply majority rule when the agenda is a two-element set. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603133
Cover Image
Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economics Letters 128 (2015) C, pp. 79-82
satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011208444
Cover Image
A Non-dictatorial Criterion for Optimal Growth Models
Kama, Alain Ayong Le; Van, Cuong Le; Schubert, Katheline - Development and Policies Research Center (Depocen) - 2008
preference relation between them. This relation is ideally required to satisfy two main axioms, the Pareto axiom, which … guarantees efficiency, and the Anonymity axiom, which guarantees equity. Basu and Mitra [2003] show that it is impossible to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968654
Cover Image
Ambiguous social choice functions
Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman - 2021
property of neutrality. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012819024
Cover Image
Symmetric majority rules.
Bubboloni, Daniela; Gori, Michele - Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, … - 2014
In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the rules which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle. In particular, supposing that individuals and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011262855
Cover Image
Strategy-Proof Preference Aggregation and the Anonymity-Neutrality Tradeoff
Athanasoglou, Stergios; Bonkoungou, Somouaoga; Ehlers, … - 2023
the only one satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness (SP). For more than two alternatives, anonymity and … concepts in an intuitive manner. Dropping anonymity and keeping neutrality, we identify and analyze the first known nontrivial … they retain their desirable properties. Dropping neutrality and keeping anonymity, we establish possibility results for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014357423
Cover Image
Selecting anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric minimal majority rules.
Gori, Michele - Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, … - 2014
Assuming that alternatives are three or more, we prove that if the set of anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric minimal majority rules is nonempty, then it has at least two elements. We propose then further principles linked to equity and fairness that can be used to exclude some rules in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010816297
Cover Image
Anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric majority rules
Bubboloni, Daniela; Gori, Michele - Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, … - 2013
In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumptions that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders over the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric rules and for the existence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201346