We generalize some recent results developed in static policy games with multiple players, to a dynamic context. We find that the classical theory of economic policy can be usefully applied to a strategic context of difference games: if one player satisfies the Golden Rule, then either all other...

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy developed by Tinbergen and Theil to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium...

In the last 20 years issues of policy effectiveness and neutrality (notably with reference to monetary policy) have been increasingly raised in the context of static LQ (linear-quadratic) policy games. The general conditions ensuring policy non-neutrality in a strategic environment remains...

Issues of policy effectiveness and neutrality are widespread in the economic literature. They have been increasingly raised in specific contexts within the class of LQ (linear-quadratic) policy games in the last 20 years, notably with reference to monetary policy. The more general conditions...

Issues of policy effectiveness and neutrality are widespread in the economic literature. They have been increasingly raised in specific contexts within the class of LQ (linear-quadratic) policy games in the last 20 years, notably with reference to monetary policy. The more general conditions...

This paper outlines the evolution of the theory of economic policy from the classical contributions of Ragnar Frisch, Ian Tinbergen, Bent Hansen, Henri Theil to recent work in the field of strategic interaction. The new, emerging theory of economic policy, albeit rooted in the classical...

This paper outlines the evolution of the theory of economic policy from the classical contributions of Frisch, Hansen, Tinbergen and Theil to situations of strategic interaction. Andrew Hughes Hallett has taken an active and relevant part in this evolution, having contributed to both the...

This paper presents a monopolistic competition model of a bank choosing the optimal level of the screening effort in the presence of cross-selling activities. We demonstrate that, in absence of informational synergies, the larger is the range of services that the bank produces, the lower is the...