Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 71,765
Cover Image
Robust incentives for teams
Dai, Tianjiao; Toikka, Juuso - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 90 (2022) 4, pp. 1583-1613
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013382394
Cover Image
Should they compete or should they cooperate? : the view of agency theory
Fleckinger, Pierre; Martimort, David; Roux, Nicolas - 2023
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014247118
Cover Image
Contract design with limited liability
Quintero, José E. - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003629341
Cover Image
Contracting with researchers
Verbeck, Matthias; Schulte, Elisabeth - 2016
We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on behalf of a principal. The agents' success depends on effort and the choice of a research technology that is uncertain with respect to its quality. A single agent has no incentive to deviate from the principal's preferred...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450575
Cover Image
Team incentives under moral and altruistic preferences : which team to choose?
Sarkisian, Roberto - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012266444
Cover Image
Contracting in a continuous-time model with Three-Sided Moral Hazard and Cost Synergies
Yang, Nian; Yang, Jun; Chen, Yu - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011797782
Cover Image
Team incentives under moral and altruistic preferences : wich team to choose?
Sarkisian, Roberto - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-24
in a team setting with two agents whose efforts affect output stochastically, I demonstrate that the power of extrinsic … principal. I also show that a team of moral agents will only be preferred if the production technology exhibits decreasing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771132
Cover Image
An analysis of net-outcome contracting with applications to equity-based compensation
Hofmann, Christian; Huddart, Steven J.; Pfeiffer, Thomas - In: Review of accounting studies 28 (2023) 3, pp. 1657-1689
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014383868
Cover Image
Relative Performance or Team Evaluation? Optimal Contracts for Other-Regarding Agents
Bartling, Björn - 2010
assume that agents are inequity averse or status seeking. We show that team contracts can be optimal even if the agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224219
Cover Image
Robust contract designs : linear contracts and moral hazard
Yu, Yimin; Kong, Xiangyin - In: Operations research 68 (2020) 5, pp. 1457-1473
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012301562