Discussion of "equilibrium earnings management and managerial compensation in a multiperiod agency setting"
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Marinovic, Iván |
Other Persons: | Dutta, Sunil (reviewed) ; Fan, Qintao (contributor) |
Published in: |
Review of accounting studies. - Norwell, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 1380-6653, ZDB-ID 1334761-5. - Vol. 19.2014, 3, p. 1078-1085
|
Subject: | Earnings management | contracting | LEN | Incentives | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Bilanzpolitik | Accounting policy | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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