Equilibrium earnings management and managerial compensation in a multiperiod agency setting
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dutta, Sunil ; Fan, Qintao |
Published in: |
Review of accounting studies. - Norwell, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 1380-6653, ZDB-ID 1334761-5. - Vol. 19.2014, 3, p. 1047-1077
|
Subject: | Earnings management | Compensation contract | Pay-performance sensitivity | Information asymmetry | Bilanzpolitik | Accounting policy | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Lohn | Wages | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Aktienoption | Stock option |
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