Maximally representative allocations for guaranteed delivery advertising campaigns
R. Preston McAfee; Kishore Papineni; Sergei Vassilvitskii
| Year of publication: |
2013
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | McAfee, Randolph Preston ; Papineni, Kishore ; Vassilvitskii, Sergei |
| Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 17.2013, 2, p. 83-94
|
| Subject: | advertising | representativeness | mechanism design | market design | bidding | exchange | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Werbung | Advertising | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754649