Paying to match : decentralized markets with information frictions
Year of publication: |
January 3, 2021
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Authors: | Agranov, Marina ; Dianat, Ahrash ; Samuelson, Larry ; Yariv, Leeat |
Publisher: |
Princeton, NJ : Benjamin H. Griswold III, Class of 1933, Center for Economic Policy Studies, Department of Economics, Princeton University |
Subject: | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Matching | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Stabilität eines Gleichgewichts | Stability of equilibrium | Theorie | Theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | Working paper. - Princeton, NJ, ZDB-ID 2674568-9. - Vol. no. 273 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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Paying to match : decentralized markets with information frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
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Paying to match : decentralized markets with information frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
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Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
- More ...
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Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
-
Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
-
Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
- More ...