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Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation

Chaigneau, Pierre - In: The European journal of finance 21 (2015) 13/15, pp. 1357-1373

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419883

Changes in probability distributions and the form of compensation contracts

Chaigneau, Pierre - In: Economic theory bulletin 3 (2015) 2, pp. 223-232

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408214

Does improved information improve incentives?

Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel - In: Journal of financial economics 130 (2018) 2, pp. 291-307

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012051316

Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts

Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas; … - In: Economics letters 157 (2017), pp. 14-16

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011847288

A theory of fair ceo pay

Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477768

Managerial compensation and firm value in the presence of socially responsible investors

Chaigneau, Pierre - In: Journal of business ethics : JOBE 149 (2018) 3, pp. 747-768

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011867273

The optimal timing of CEO compensation

Chaigneau, Pierre - In: Finance research letters 24 (2018), pp. 90-94

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011982473

CEO gender-based termination concerns : evidence from initial severance agreements

Klein, Felice B.; Chaigneau, Pierre; Devers, Cynthia E. - In: Journal of management 47 (2021) 3, pp. 567-596

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012485756

The effect of monitoring on CEO compensation in a matching equilibrium

Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - In: Journal of financial and quantitative analysis : JFQA 53 (2018) 3, pp. 1297-1339

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011930415

Executive compensation with social and environmental performance

Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - 2024

How to incentivize a manager to create value and be socially responsible? A manager can predict how his decisions will affect measures of social performance, and will therefore game an incentive system that relies on these measures. Still, we show that the compensation contract uses measures of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014491819