We consider a social choice problem in various economic environments consisting of n individuals, 4\leqn+\infty, each of which is supposed to have classical preferences. A social choice rule is a function associating with each profile of individual preferences a social preference that is assumed...

We axiomatize the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (1975) in the Nash bargaining problems if the feasible sets can be finite. We show that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is the unique solution satisfying Continuity (in the Hausdorff topology endowed with payoffs space), Independence (which is weaker...

A binary relation is indifference-transitive if its symmetric part satisfies the transitivity axiom. We investigated the properties of Arrovian aggregation rules that generate acyclic and indifference-transitive social preferences. We proved that there exists unique vetoer in the rule if the...

We investigate the implications of relaxing Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom while retaining transitivity and the Pareto condition. Even a small relaxation opens a floodgate of possibilities for nondictatorial and efficient social choice.

A social welfare function is Arrovian if it is transitive-valued and satisfies IIA. We examine the logical relation between the statements (A) If f is Arrovian with domain F then it is dictatorial if it satisfies the Pareto criterion and (W) If f is Arrovian with domain F then it is dictatorial...

For social choice rules that can select either one or two alternatives, strategy-proofness is incompatible with a weak Condorcet principle.