This paper is concerned with the stategic use of a private information on the stock market. A repeated auction model is used to analyze the evolution of the price system on a market with asymmetric information. The model turns out to be a zero-sum repeated game with one-sided information, as...

The plea bargaining procedure, namely the viability of a stage of bargaining between prosecutor and defendant in criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomlete information game.

A profit maximising auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...

In a differential information economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically non-empty. How ever, we exhibit a well-behaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if...

In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium,if the electorate is large.

In this paper, we analyze the trade war between two large countries when the trade policy is decided through majority voting. We show how the trade war equilibrium depends on the median voter production factor relative endowment. We compare this equilibrium to the one analyzed by Johnson where...

In this note, we consider a negotiation model wherein a simultaneous voting game, which endogenizes the choice of the bargaining procedur, is introduced.

We consider the effect of asymmetric information on price formation process in a financial market where private information is held by a market maker. A Byesian game is proposed in which there is price competition between two market makers with two different information partition.