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Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games
Chassang, Sylvain; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 1, pp. 49-93
equilibrium values in the repeated prisoners' dilemma. We show that robustness requirements have sharp intuitive implications …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695089
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The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time
Bernard, Benjamin; Frei, Christoph - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 411-453
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011500610
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The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time
Bernard, Benjamin; Frei, Christoph - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 411-453
We prove a folk theorem for multiplayer games in continuous time when players observe a public signal distorted by Brownian noise. The proof is based on a rigorous foundation for such continuous-time multiplayer games. We study in detail the relation between behaviour and mixed strategies, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672043
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Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
Laclau, Marie - In: Games and economic behavior 87 (2014), pp. 136-160
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304957
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The folk theorem in repeated games of incomplete information
Cripps, Martin - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000915409
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How robust is the folk theorem?
Hörner, Johannes; Olszewski, Wojciech - In: The quarterly journal of economics 124 (2009) 4, pp. 1773-1814
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003930508
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Repeated games where the payoffs and monitoring structure are unknown
Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 78 (2010) 5, pp. 1673-1710
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008798255
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A few bad apples spoil the barrel : an anti-folk theorem for anonymous repeated games with incomplete information
Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander - In: The American economic review 110 (2020) 12, pp. 3817-3835
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431233
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Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure are Unknown
Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2010
concept of perfect public ex post equilibrium (PPXE), and show that it can be characterized with an extension of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189266
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Continuous-time games with imperfect and abrupt information
Bernard, Benjamin - In: The review of economic studies : RES 91 (2024) 4, pp. 1988-2052
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015046453