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Relative performance evaluation, pay-for-luck, and double-dipping in CEO compensation
Jiménez-Angueira, Carlos E.; Stuart, Nathan V. - In: Review of quantitative finance and accounting 44 (2015) 4, pp. 701-732
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333147
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The relation between earnings-based measures in firm debt contracts and CEO pay sensitivity to earnings
Rhodes, Adrienne - In: Journal of accounting & economics 61 (2016) 1, pp. 1-22
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453403
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Economic consequences of managerial compensation contract disclosure
Xiong, Yan; Jiang, Xu - In: Journal of accounting & economics 73 (2022) 2/3, pp. 1-22
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013264643
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Contractual features of CEO performance-vested equity compensation
Gao, Zhan; Hwang, Yuhchang; Wu, Wan-Ting - In: Journal of contemporary accounting & economics 13 (2017) 3, pp. 282-303
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011791459
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Incentives, termination payments, and CEO contracting
Gillan, Stuart L.; Nguyen Nga - In: The journal of corporate finance : contracting, … 41 (2016), pp. 445-465
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011619883
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Fixed Salary or Incentive Contract? The Effect of Stickiness of Compensation Contracts
Wakabayashi, Toshiaki - 2022
This study adopts behavioral contract theory through a mathematical model and clarifies the situation in which a fixed …–salary contract is preferable to incentives–based one for the principal. Theoretically, the expected utility for the principal is … higher under an incentives–based contract but, in reality, there are companies that employ people via fixed–salary contracts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296794
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Was Sarbanes–Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation
Gayle, George-Levi; Li, Chen; Miller, Robert - 2022
This paper investigates the effects of regulatory interventions on contracting relationships within firms by examining the impacts of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act on CEO compensation. Using panel data of the S&P 1500 firms, it quantifies welfare gains from a principal–agent model with hidden...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014244206
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All hat and no cattle? : ESG incentives in executive compensation
Efing, Matthias; Ehmann, Stefanie; Kampkötter, Patrick; … - 2024
This paper examines the integration of ESG performance metrics into executive compensation using a detailed panel dataset of European executives. Despite becoming more widespread, most ESG metrics are largely discretionary, carry immaterial weights in payout calculations, and contribute little...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015077841
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The role of affect in shaping the behavioral consequences of CEO option incentives
Zolotoy, Leon; O'Sullivan, Don; Martin, Geoffrey; … - In: Journal of management 45 (2019) 7, pp. 2920-2951
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012064224
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Are relative performance measures in CEO incentive contracts used for risk reduction and/or for strategic interaction?
Vrettos, Dimitris - In: The accounting review : a publication of the American … 88 (2013) 6, pp. 2179-2212
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010231038