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Azrieli, Yaron - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1313-1350

We study the design of contracts that incentivize experts to collect information and truthfully report it to a decision maker. We depart from most of the previous literature by assuming that the transfers cannot depend on the realized state or on the ex post payoff of the decision maker. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806483

Subjective performance evaluation of employees with biased beliefs

Foschi, Matteo; Santos-Pinto, Luís - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865509

Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard

Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1357-1401

We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We show that under a multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327130

A principal-agent model of sequential testing

Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas Jóver - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 425-463

This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a dynamic information acquisition process. In every period, the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal's decision. Each signal may or may not provide definitive evidence in favor of the good state. Neither...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689319

Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? : an experimental investigation

Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; … - 2018

This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822038

Crowdfunding, demand uncertainty, and moral hazard : a mechanism design approach

Strausz, Roland - 2015

Crowdfunding challenges the traditional separation between finance and marketing. It creates economic value by reducing demand uncertainty, which enables a better screening of positive NPV projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this effect. Using mechanism design, mechanisms are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011309652

Mechanism design with moral hazard

Kwon, Suehyun - 2017

This paper studies dynamic mechanism design in the presence of moral hazard. Revelation principle extends to models with moral hazard for both full commitment and limited commitment, but I also identify environments in which the principal doesn't benefit from eliciting agents' private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011717264

Information elicitation and influenza vaccine production

Chick, Stephen E.; Hasija, Sameer; Nasiry, Javad - In: Operations research 65 (2017) 1, pp. 75-96

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011648867

An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence

Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336

An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence

Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014, First version: November 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347030